The Development of a Theory of Rational Intertemporal Choice by Loewe, Germán
Papers 80, 2006 195-221
Papers 80 001-312  13/12/06  10:54  Página 195Abstract
The aim of this article is to describe the evolution of a very dynamic theory: the theory of
intertemporal choice. I present the first economic thinking on intertemporal decision-making,
and expose how it resulted in Samuelson’s famous discounted utility model; then I describe
how and why discounted utility became the standard approach to intertemporal choice in
economics through the alleged normative and positive validity of dynamic consistency. Next,
I review how the widening of experiments challenged discounted utility together with the
dynamic consistency hypothesis, and turned intertemporal choice into a truly interdiscipli-
nary field of research. Finally, I discuss the foundations of dynamic consistency and prove
that it is neither normatively nor descriptively justified as a necessary axiom of rational inter-
temporal choice. I also show how until only recently, the dynamic consistency debate has
had a blinding effect on the relative importance attributed to other fundamental anomalies
in discounted utility. And this blinding effect can be regarded as a further side-effect of the
excessive role given to dynamic consistency along these years. I thus conclude that dynamic
consistency has been acting as an invisible straitjacket obstructing the development of inter-
temporal choice theory, and that it is only by undoing it that this field of research can achie-
ve in the future a satisfactory understanding of human decision-making.
Key words: decision theory, intertemporal choice, rationality, dynamic consistency, expe-
rimental economics.
Resumen. El desarrollo de una teoría de la elección racional intertemporal
El objetivo de este artículo es describir la evolución de una teoría muy dinámica: la teoría
de la elección intertemporal. Se presentan las primeras teorizaciones económicas sobre la
toma de decisiones intertemporal, y se expone cómo desembocan en el famoso modelo de
utilidad descontada de Samuelson; seguidamente se describe cómo y por qué la utilidad
descontada se convirtió en el enfoque estándar de la elección intertemporal en la econo-
mía, gracias a la pretendida validez positiva y normativa de la consistencia dinámica. A
continuación, se revisa cómo la extensión de los experimentos desafió las hipótesis de uti-
lidad descontada y de consistencia dinámica, e hizo de la elección intertemporal un autén-
tico campo de investigación interdisciplinar. Finalmente, se discuten los fundamentos de
la consistencia dinámica y se prueba que ésta no está justificada ni descriptiva ni normati-
vamente como un axioma de la elección racional intertemporal. También se muestra cómo,
hasta muy recientemente, el debate sobre la consistencia dinámica ha producido un efec-
to de «deslumbramiento» que ha impedido advertir la importancia de otras anomalías
fundamentales en la utilidad descontada. Y este efecto puede ser considerado como un
efecto lateral más del excesivo papel otorgado a la consistencia dinámica durante esos años.
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sible que ha obstruído el desarrollo de la teoría de la elección intertemporal, y que sólo
erradicándola podrá este campo de investigación alcanzar en el futuro una comprensión
satisfactoria de la toma de decisiones humana.
Palabras clave: teoría de la decisión, elección intertemporal, racionalidad, consistencia
dinámica, economía experimental.
On the 13th of September 1848 a horrible accident occurred near Cavendish,
Vermont. When the foreman of a railway construction gang was preparing an
explosion, he started tamping directly onto the explosive powder with his iron
rod. The sparks immediately struck fire, producing a big blast that shot up
the iron rod towards the man’s head. The iron penetrated his left cheek bone
and went out through the top of his head, crossing the whole frontal part of his
brain and landing 300 feet away. His name was Phineas Gage, and every stu-
dent in neurology knows today the rest of the story. He survived the accident
without any apparent damage to his mental capacities. He could even return
to work in a few weeks, and no difference was to be observed in his behavior.
But, according to everyone who had contact with him thereafter, there was in
fact one difference: Phineas Gage had become impulsive, capricious and com-
pletely unable to plan ahead, and spent the rest of his life drifting in the
moment, from one abandoned job to another, until his early death at age thir-
ty-eight (Damasio 1994; Macmillan 2000).
Neurobiology knows today that a variety of activities occurring in the pre-
frontal cortices regulate our capacity to undertake planned behavior (Manuck,
Flory, Muldoon & Ferrell 2003). Damages of this brain area have been found
to affect one’s ability to control impulses and execute plans, ability that turns
out to be of crucial importance to conduct a normal life. In essence, every per-
son needs to be able to postpone rewards, and follow a plan that demands sac-
rifice in the present and yields benefits in the long run. Almost any decision we
make includes this ability: we put effort in our job to improve our position
and get recognized in the future; we save money now in order to be able to
buy something later; we diet in March in order to look better in July.
But not always postponing rewards is advisable. Sometimes, we are also
told how important it is to enjoy the moment and stop thinking on the future
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should not postpone all rewards systematically to the future, since in that case
we would never see the benefits of our decisions materialized. Strictly speaking,
the question of when to choose a smaller-sooner reward over a larger-later
reward1, and when to choose vice versa, remains unanswered. Social science
has, nevertheless, studied this topic in depth, both from a normative and from
a positive perspective. A theory of intertemporal choice has developed over
more than two hundred years to become, today, one of the most effervescent
fields of social research.
In the beginning, intertemporal choice was a purely economic theory; but
along these years this discipline has turned into an interdisciplinary field of
research involving psychologists, economists, sociologists, mathematicians,
neuroscientists, ethologists, etc., all mutually benefiting from their respective
findings2. As a result, intertemporal choice models have been scrutinized for the
last twenty-five years by hundreds of experiments and alternative theories,
challenging the standard formulations made by economists in the first half of
the twentieth century, and significantly improving the understanding of human
decision making. We know how people react in many situations; we know,
for instance, that people are more impatient for small amounts of money
than for big amounts; that people prefer an increasing sequence of money over
a decreasing one; or that the framing of intertemporal choice problems strong-
ly affects decisions, for example. But while much of this knowledge contradicts
the standard economic theory, no clear alternative model has yet emerged.
Intertemporal choice consists in our days of a collection of theoretical alter-
natives, each of them explaining only part of the empirical evidence.
The way intertemporal choice has developed over the last two centuries
perfectly exposes the difficulties of an economic theory to achieve empirical
validity. Intertemporal choice went successfully through two decisive steps:
first, a clear mathematical formulation made possible that experimentalists
knew what to test; second, both economists and researchers from neighbor
disciplines started examining the generated evidence and collaborated in find-
ing better models. But in its path, I will argue, intertemporal choice has had to
confront a particularly strong obstructing force. What this obstacle has been and
how it has been overcome, both are the object of analysis of this paper. The
plan is as follows: in the next section I will describe the first economic theories
of intertemporal choice; then I will present discounted utility, the theory that
established as the standard in the twentieth century; next I will describe the
experimental challenge to this theory appeared in the last decades; and final-
ly, I will analyze the main obstacle found by intertemporal choice in its path to
supersede discounted utility. In the conclusions I will try to extract the lessons
1. Or, put in terms of punishments, a larger-sooner punishment over a smaller-later punish-
ment.
2. See Loewenstein, Read & Baumeister 2002 (eds.) for a collection of recent contributions to
intertemporal choice from different disciplines.
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theories.
The Origins of Intertemporal Choice Theory
The idea that the value of a good depends on the timing of its consumption was
already present in the economic thought of the 18th century3. But an in-depth
study of the economic and psychological motivations underlying time prefer-
ence had to wait until the publication in 1834 of The Sociological Theory of
Capital, written by who is in consequence considered the father of intertem-
poral choice modelling: John Rae4. According to Rae, someone’s time prefer-
ences are explained by his «effective desire of accumulation». And this desire,
he claimed, is determined by the following four factors:
I. The Bequest Motive
II. Self-restrain
III.Uncertainty of Human Life
IV. Excitement of Immediate Consumption
Factors I and II are considered to promote the desire of accumulation,
while factors III and IV are supposed to limit it. But all four factors jointly
determine a person’s time preference. Thus, for example, the more uncertain-
ty an individual has over his life (factor III), the less he will care about the
future, and, consequently, the lower will be his desire of accumulation. On
the other hand, the higher his affections towards his heir (factor I), the more
value he will give to the future, and, consequently, the higher will his desire
of accumulation be5.
The marginalist William Stanley Jevons took years later the following more
technical view (Jevons 1888 [1871]): to maximize total utility (pleasure) over
time, a person ought to distribute consumption of a good over ‘n’ days so as to
equal each days’ marginal utility6 vi times the probability pi of the good remain-
ing consumable:
v1p1 = v2p2 = … vnpn (1)
3. Even a formula for present value existed already in that times, thanks to contributions like
that of Halley, more famous for the comet that bears his name. (Mark Rubinstein 2003).
4. The relevance of Rae’s work as a pioneering one in this topic is made clear by Irwin Fisher’s
dedication of his famous Theory of Interest: «To The Memory of John Rae and of Eugen
von Böhm-Bawerk Who Laid the Foundations Upon Which I Have Endeavoured to Build»
(Fisher 1930).
5. And, hence, according to Rae, the higher his nation’s wealth will be. Interestingly, Rae’s
own theory on the Wealth of Nations was precisely based on the different desire of accu-
mulation of their inhabitants. (Fredrick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue 2002)
6. Marginal utility is the utility of the last unit of consumption. If one drinks three beers in a
row, the third glass contributes probably less to our wellbeing than it does the first. Economists
refer to this preference pattern by saying this person has decreasing marginal utility for beer.
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bottles of very good wine in the next three days. Since the probability of the wine
remaining good for the next days is almost equal to one (p1 = p2 = p3 = 1),
Jevons’ formula would recommend that he does not drink all of it in the first
day, since, in that case, and due to decreasing marginal utility —where more
consumptions implies lower marginal utility—, v1 would be lower than v2 and
v3, and the equality would not hold. The underlying idea is that one ought to
distribute consumption over time so as to maximize total pleasure, and not
over-consume in one period to the expense of the others. If, instead of wine,
one were to decide on the consumption of three bottles of, say, milk-shake,
the same formula would suggest concentrating consumption in the present,
under the risk of it becoming inconsumable later.
In general, since (pi) is to be assumed a decreasing sequence for obvious
reasons, this equation predicts that an individual’s allocation to future con-
sumption of any commodity will be less than his allocation to present
consumption, since, for future periods, a lower probability will have to be
compensated with a higher marginal utility, and to obtain a higher marginal util-
ity you need to consume a smaller amount of the commodity7. Thus, Jevons
assumed that, owing to the fact that there is an intrinsic uncertainty on whether
future consumption is ever going to happen, there is a rational preference for
present over delayed consumption. But he also acknowledged an irrational
time preference, due to men not being perfectly foresighted. To take this fact
into account, he defined q1, q2, …, qn to be «the undetermined fractions which
express the ratios of the present pleasures or pains to those future ones from whose
anticipation they arise» (Jevons, 1888, III.62). Such discounting factors entered
his previous equation to make it as follows:
v1p1q1 =v1p1q1 = … = vnpnqn (2)
We can immediately see how these new ‘irrational’ factors become a fur-
ther explanation of why people allocate less consumption to the future than
to the present. It is natural to assume that instant pleasures will be more val-
ued than the anticipation of the same pleasures. If, in consequence, (qi) is con-
sidered a decreasing sequence too, then equation (2) means that individuals
allocate lower consumption to the future than to the present for two distinct
motives. One is deemed rational —intrinsic uncertainty on the mere possi-
bility of future consumption— while the other is considered irrational 
—undervaluation of future pleasures—.
7. That lower consumption means higher marginal utility is true only under the assumption
of diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Under this view, there are then two com-
peting forces: diminishing marginal utility invites us to postpone consumption because of
satiation, while uncertainty on the good remaining consumable recommends us not to do
it. Note that, without the assumption of diminishing marginal utility, there would be no rea-
son (in this framework) not to consume all available quantity of a good in the present.
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tendency to underestimate future pleasures may be due to humans lacking the
capacity to make a complete picture of their future wants, especially when it
comes to remotely distant ones8. Böhm-Bawerk’s voluminous work Capital
and Interest was entirely devoted to the study of time preferences and it devel-
oped the methodology, already present in Jevons9, of considering the alloca-
tion to different consumption periods a technical question; in essence, a mat-
ter of efficiency.
This ‘technical’ approach was further perfected by the American econo-
mist Irwin Fisher, who achieved a formalization of time preference in terms
of economic trade-offs among consumption in two different periods (Fisher
1930). According to Fisher, every person has his own rate of ‘impatience’, one
that depends upon objective factors (size and risk of future income) and sub-
jective factors (foresight, strength of will, habit, uncertainty, selfishness, influ-
ence of fashion). But Fisher’s theory aimed at describing equilibrium in the
financial market, where —he thought— all different rates of impatience would
have been homogenized by the market interest rate (through borrowing and
lending).
The Birth of Discounted Utility
As his predecessors, Fisher’s great insight into time preferences already announced
the basic economic relations in intertemporal choice. But neither Fisher nor
Böhm-Bawerk or Jevons achieved to propose a specific mathematical function
describing time preferences in general (for any number of outcomes and peri-
ods). It was the economist Paul Samuelson (Samuelson 1937) who found a
solution in a very influential paper entitled «A Note on the Measurement of
Utility». Building on all previous knowledge, Samuelson investigated what
mathematical structure makes it possible to explain intertemporal choices for
any number of periods. Finding such a structure required making several assump-
tions. A most fundamental one was that «the individual behaves so as to max-
imize the sum of all future utilities». Mathematically, the individual was sup-
posed by Samuelson to behave so as to maximize the following function10:
8. This line of research has been lately further developed in Loewenstein, O’Donogue &
Rabin (2003), who show that people systematically tend to mispredict their future utility
by considering it too similar to their current utility. (People systematically fail to predict
how quickly they will adapt to being rich after having won the lottery, for example)
9. I depart here of the opinion of Fredrick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002) who con-
sider Böhm-Bawerk to be the first to favour this methodology. My position is based on the
formulae just presented, where Jevons clearly argues for an allocation that maximizes util-
ity over different periods as if they were different alternative ‘uses’ of the good.
10. I will here reproduce Samuelson’s theory in a discrete-time setting; Samuelson himself devel-
oped his argument in a continuous setting.
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where V(x, t) is the utility value of income x occurring in time distance t. But,
according to Samuelson, future utility is not directly comparable to present
utility. Future utilities need to be «reduced to comparable magnitudes by suit-
able time discounting», in his words. His idea, much in the spirit of Jevons
and other predecessors, was to introduce the common intuition that a good
in the future is less valuable than receiving the same good today. Now the nat-
ural question to ask is how should such a discounting of future magnitudes
occur? And here came Samuelson’s most decisive assumption: discounting was
considered independent (separate) from utility. An individual’s time prefer-
ences were disentangled into a regular utility function for money11 U(x) 
—also called ‘instantaneous utility’—, and a discount function D(t) that assigns
a weight to utility at every time period. The original utility function can in
consequence be substituted by the following one:
V(x,t) = D(t) · U(xt)
The individual is assumed to have an ‘instantaneous utility’ for the money
quantities at every period, U(xt). This function does not depend on the tim-
ing of consumption; it is supposed to represent the pleasure12 one derives in the
moment of consumption. Any time preference is thus confined to the dis-
count function D(t). And in consequence, the individual is now assumed to
maximize the following utility function:
(2)
The disentanglement of value into instantaneous utility and discount func-
tion is an arbitrary assumption that imposes a particular structure on time pref-
erences. Samuelson did, thus, impose two fundamental —and arbitrary—
assumptions: behaviour as maximization of the sum of future utilities, and dis-
counting of future utilities computed as a separate function.
But in fact, Samuelson went further and proposed a specific discount func-
tion to solve his measurement problem: Samuelson assumed that people dis-
count future amounts by means of an exponential function. The choice of
exponential discounting was inspired by the following reasoning: when an
11. Samuelson’s theory was intended to explain only preferences over money income.
Nevertheless, his theory has been used in very different domains.
12. Modern economics does not anymore identify utility with pleasure. I have used this term
to better illustrate what instantaneous utility is intended to be. A more technical interpre-
tation of a utility function is the following: values assigned to every choice alternative make
it possible for us to explain observed behaviour as if the individual aimed at maximizing
those values. Only under the ‘benthamite’ assumption that people’s behaviour is exclusively
explained by their seeking of pleasure and avoiding of pain both concepts of utility share the
same meaning.
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for the future, it is natural to assume that he takes into account the fact that
money will yield an interest during this time (Samuelson 1937). And it was
simplest for Samuelson to compute this interest as a ‘constant compounded
interest’, the most standard way of computing interests in financial econom-
ics. Let us briefly follow his reasoning: under compounded interest, any amount
X0 yields a total interest of i · X0 during the first period, becoming X1 in period
one:
X1 = X0 + i · X0 = X0 · (1+i)
For a total of t periods, and under the assumption of equal (constant)
interest rate for each period, we find that:
X1 = X0 ·(1 + i)
1
X2 = X1 · (1 + i)
1 = X0 · (1 + i)
2
X3 = X2 · (1 + i)
1 = X0 · (1 + i)
3
…
Xt = Xt-1 · (1 + i)
1 = X0 · (1 + i)
t
This model is usually referred to as ‘constant compounded interest’, and
can be used to compute the total interest a certain amount of money will yield
in a certain period. Now Samuelson used Xt = X0 ·(1 + i)
t to define a discount
function by simply inverting the terms:
or
Now we can enter this discount function into Samuelson’s previous for-
mulation:
(3)
The result is the most widely used model for intertemporal choice: the so-
called discounted utility model13. Its elegance and parsimony is undisputed,
13. Thus, when economists refer to discounted utility, they normally mean exponentially dis-
counted utility.
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approach. Time preference was now captured into one single parameter: the dis-
count rate i. And the model is intuitive enough so as to be regarded as plausi-
ble. The main relations are explained: the later an amount, the lower its pre-
sent equivalent value; more impatience (higher i) means stronger discounting
at every period; higher instantaneous utility of an outcome in the future means
higher present value in the same proportion; and a sequence of future out-
comes is valued today as the sum of each outcome’s present value. At first
glance, the model was no doubt a sensible tool to describe intertemporal
choices.
Dynamic Consistency and the Final Establishment of Discounted Utility
While the scientific community was rapidly assimilating discounted utility,
Samuelson himself had proven very skeptical about it: «The idea that such a
[mathematical] investigation could have any influence upon ethical judgments
of policy is one which deserves the impatience of modern economists», wrote
Samuelson (Samuelson 1937). He saw his result as a pure mathematical find-
ing, and was perfectly aware of the many assumptions underlying the theory.
One of them was particularly worrying: the choice of exponential discount-
ing. Why exactly were people to discount exponentially? As we just saw, the
rationale for it given by Samuelson was based on the way interest is comput-
ed in the financial world. But, why would someone’s impatience necessarily
have the structure of compounded interest?
In 1956 Robert Strotz gave the answer (Strotz 1956): exponential dis-
counting is the only discount function that guarantees the principle of
dynamic consistency. In other words, Strotz showed that if an individual’s
time preferences had a structure different from exponential discounting,
then he would be unable to follow his own plans. Suppose an individual
prefers €110 in 3 days over €100 in 2 days, but prefers €100 now over €110
tomorrow. From the distance, he prefers the larger-later amount, but once
he approaches consumption, he cannot stick to his previous decision and
decides to go for the smaller-immediate amount. Such an individual would
plan a certain action and continuously reconsider his decision without ever
being able to stick to previous plans, much like Phineas Gage after his ter-
rific accident14.
After Strotz’ contribution, the choice of exponential discounting was not an
arbitrary choice anymore, nor a choice of convenience; exponential discount-
14. In fact Strotz went one step further and considered the case where an individual with non-
exponential preferences is aware of his own dynamic inconsistency problem. In that case,
Strotz argued, we can think of two strategies in front of inconsistency: either the individ-
ual uses commitment devices, as when Ulysses tied himself to the mast; or he considers
only those actions that will entail no inconsistency problem. (Strotz was the first to use the
famous Ulysses and the Sirens example as early as 1956)
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on the fundamental intuition that any normal person is in fact able to plan
ahead. Next I present a synthetic version of Strotz’ mathematical argument.
Suppose it is Friday and an individual —call him Alex— realizes this
weekend he only can afford k hours of his preferred activity —watching sports
on TV— for he needs to get an academic presentation finished by Monday.
He thus decides to allow himself a total of k hours TV within the weekend,
and to spend the rest of the time working on his presentation. His prefer-
ences are such that the pleasure he derives from watching TV marginally
decreases with time15. Now suppose Alex’s preferences at time τ over the set
of all possible TV consumption paths can be represented by the following
utility function:
where ln(xt)
16 is an ‘instantaneous utility function’ assigning a value to
every amount of TV hours xt at time t, while D(t – τ) is a general discount
function that weighs the utility of consumptions depending on the time-
distance between a future (or past) date t and the present moment τ (T
being the total number of periods). In other words, suppose Alex behaves
as if he maximized the discrete-time equivalence to Samuelson’s previous
function (2), in which we have specified the instantaneous utility func-
tion (as a logarithmic one), but left unspecified the discount function.
We can now ask what maximization problem does in fact face Alex on
Friday. If we use dt–τ for D(t – τ), Alex’s utility as seen on Friday (at τ = 0)
is the following:
u0 (x0, x1, x2) = d0 ln(x0) + d1 ln(x1) + d2 ln(x2)
where x0, x1, x2 are, respectively, TV hours watched on Friday, Saturday and
Sunday. And his optimization problem is to maximize utility over the weekend
subject to the constraint of not watching more than k hours TV.
max u(x0, x1, x2)
s.t.
x0 + x1 + x2 = k
Using Lagrange multipliers we find the following first-order conditions for
a maximum:
15. The problem becomes trivial if that is not the case: under the assumption of positive time
preference, in the absence of marginally decreasing utility Alex would allocate all budget-
ed leisure into the nearest possible period. It is the assumption of diminishing marginal
utility that makes intertemporal choice problems interesting, since it constitutes a coun-
terbalance to positive time preference.
16. Logarithmic functions are often used to describe utility of consumption because they are mar-
ginally decreasing.
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weekend according to how he relatively values consumption occurring at dif-
ferent time-distances.
Now let us look at what decision-problem he faces one day after, on Saturday
(before consumption). For the sake of simplicity, let us assume, d-1 = d-2 = 0,
i.e. the discounted value of past consumption is zero. Utility as seen from the
point of view of Saturday (at τ = 1) is then
u1 (x0, x1, x2) = d–1 ln(x0) + d0 ln(x1) + d1 ln(x2)
= d0 ln(x1) + d1 ln(x2)
and first-order conditions for a maximum are:
A natural question to ask now is under what conditions will x1
** equal x1
*;
in other words, when will optimal consumption for Saturday as seen from the
standpoint of Friday (x1
*) equal optimal consumption for Saturday as seen
from the standpoint of Saturday (x1
**), i.e. when will Alex behave dynamical-
ly consistent in this problem. Making both expressions equal we obtain the
answer:
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for the consistency of Alex’s
behavior is that the relative importance of Saturday and Sunday is the same
both from the point of view of Friday and Saturday. An inconsistency may
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ture. It can be shown that this argument extends to any number of periods,
implying that, in general, it is needed that
which, if you assume d0 = 1,
17 means the discount function must consist of
discounting the same proportion δ in every period:
D(t–τ) = δ t–τ
Since we can always express the constant discount factor as a function of a
discount rate, we find that
for τ = 0 (point of view of the present)
This formulation is exactly Samuelson’s proposed exponential discount
function. For a positive i, the discount factor δ is a number smaller than 1,
thus expressing the idea that the value of an amount in the future is to be ‘dis-
counted’ to find its equivalent in the present.
The result, as Strotz proved in a more general setting, is that, in order to
rule out dynamic inconsistency from the individual’s behavior, we need
to assume exponential discounting, or, as it is often labeled, constant dis-
counting. Constant discounting means that in every period the same discount
rate (or factor) is applied, and thus the same proportion of value is discounted.
Take, for example, the choice among (€110, 31 days) and (€100, 30 days).
Exponential discounting implies that if someone prefers the first to the lat-
ter, then
110 · δ31 > 100 · δ30
But then also
17. A natural assumption to make: utility at delay zero should equal instantaneous utility.
The Development of a Theory of Rational Intertemporal Choice Papers 80, 2006 207
Papers 80 001-312  13/12/06  10:54  Página 207This means he or she will necessarily prefer (€110, 1 day) to (€100, 0 days),
and hence behave dynamically consistent. (Figure 1)
Thus, since Strotz’ enormously influential paper, exponential discounting
has established as the necessary mathematical structure that guarantees dynam-
ic consistency; hence, since dynamic consistency is per se considered a ratio-
nality requirement, Samuelson’s discounted utility model has been regarded
also as the rational intertemporal choice model.
This strong normative support had two effects in the further development
of discounted utility. First, it gave fresh impetus to the descriptive validity of
the theory: given that it was deemed implausible that regular people could
survive without being able to stick to their own plans, exponential discount-
ing was hard to deny also from a positive perspective18. And second, it had a
blinding effect: the rest of the assumptions underlying discounted utility were
less criticized19. As a result, discounted utility established not only as the stan-
dard normative model, but also as the best attempt for a positive theory.
18. Of course, many of these arguments do not pass severe scrutiny. Here I just want to describe
how such arguments have helped the establishment of discounted utility; in a later section
I will try to show why they are wrong, and what implications this has had for the devel-
opment of intertemporal choice theory.
19. But not unexplored: several papers have studied in depth the complete axiom system of
discounted utility, discussing all assumptions and their implications. See, for instance,
Koopmans (1960), Lancaster (1963), Fishburn & Rubinstein (1982), Albrecht & Weber
(1995) and Ok & Masatlioglu (2003).
Figure 1.
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Over the last 25 years this view has changed. After the widening of experi-
ments in intertemporal choice, virtually all assumptions in discounted utility
have proven invalid as general principles of behavior. And interestingly, the
first anomaly found to contradict discounted utility was that, instead of remain-
ing constant over time, observed discount rates appear to decline with time
(or, equivalently, discount factor δt sare increasing in time). A common inter-
pretation of this phenomenon is that people consider postponing consumption
one period a bigger sacrifice when the period is close than when it is far in
the future. Discount rates that decline with time distance thus reveal ‘decreas-
ing impatience’, or, as it is often referred to in the literature, hyperbolic dis-
counting.
The finding of hyperbolic discounting has not only directly challenged
discounted utility, but also opened the Pandora’s Box of empirical testing that
has produced a large series of other anomalies now present in the literature of
intertemporal choice. Let us now revise all these anomalies in some detail.
Hyperbolic Discounting
Thaler (1981) was the first study to test the declining discount rate hypothe-
sis. He asked subjects to specify the amounts in one month, one year and ten
years they considered equivalent to receiving $15 now. The median respons-
es were, respectively, $20, $50 and $100. If we compute the annual equiva-
lent discount rate underlying these choices, we find that subjects revealed a
discount rate of 345% for the one-month period, 120% for the one-year peri-
od and 19% for the ten years horizon, a pattern that clearly supports the hyper-
bolic discounting hypothesis. Other studies have found similar results (Benzion,
Rapoport and Yagil 1989; Chapman 1996; Chapman & Elstein 1995; Pender
1996; Redelmeier and Heller 1993)20.
A second type of empirical support for hyperbolic discounting comes from
experiments on dynamic inconsistency. Several studies report systematic pref-
erence reversals between two rewards as the time-distance to these rewards
diminishes (Green, Fristoe & Myerson 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein 1995; Millar
& Navarick 1984; Solnick et al. 1980)21. For example, many people do in fact
prefer €102 in thirty-one days over €100 in thirty days but at the same time
€100 now to €102 tomorrow (see figure 2). Kirby & Herrnstein (1995) looks
at such reversals and finds an astonishing 34 out of 36 subjects who behave
inconsistently. Such overwhelming results are to be explained by the fact that
20. Recently, however, Read, Airoldi & Loewe (2005) have found that this effect disappears if
subjects are told what interest rates underlies each choice, casting doubts on the universal
validity of the standard decreasing-discount-rates finding.
21. These results have been also replicated in pigeons (Ainslie & Herrnstein 1981; Green et
al. 1981).
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subjects what is the shortest delay for €102 at which they would still prefer
€100 today. Now imagine someone said two-days, meaning for shorter delays
he would prefer the larger-later amount; then they would move both amounts
forward (keeping constant the two-days distance among them) and ask sub-
jects to choose again until either their preference reversed in favour of €102, or
a certain number of questions passed. This methodology has the advantage of
yielding the maximal amount of preference reversals, but, on the other hand,
it may be questioned methodologically by the fact that subjects may perceive
they are expected to reverse their preference. The authors did nevertheless post-
experimental interviews, and report that subjects were in fact expressing their
true preferences. And, in general, the finding of dynamic inconsistency is today
considered robust in the literature.
Several models have been proposed to account for hyperbolic discounting
but the simplest one was proposed by the psychologist Mazur (Mazur 1987)22:
22. Mazur’s discount function is similar to «simple interest» in mathematical finance.
Figure 2.
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of time. When objects of choice are distant in the future, deferring consump-
tion one period is not too relevant (example: t = 50 would mean δ50 = 0,98
for a per-period i = 0,2, meaning a difference in value of 2% among objects
in periods 49 and 50). While deferring consumption one period from the pre-
sent is much more significant (t = 1 would mean δ1 = 0,83 for the same per-
period i = 0,2, meaning a difference in value of 17% among outcomes in peri-
ods 0 and 1). This preference pattern may therefore produce dynamic
inconsistent choices. Other more general hyperbolic discounting functions
have been proposed in the literature (see Laibson 1997; Loewenstein & Prelec
1992; Elster 1979), but a model as simple as Mazur’s already captures the
essence of hyperbolic discounting for our purposes here.
Hyperbolic discounting functions have helped recently explain many phe-
nomena: they have been used to study paradoxes in the consumption-saving
behaviour (Laibson 1997; Laibson, Repetto & Tobacman 1998; Angeletos et
al. 2001), or even procrastination, since hyperbolic discounting leads a per-
son to put off an onerous activity more than he would like to from a prior
perspective (O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999c, 2001; Fischer 1999). Hyperbolic
discounting also has been used to analyse addiction (O’Donoghue & Rabin
1999a, 2000; Gruber & Koszegi 2000; Carrillo 1999), since it predicts over
consumption of highly addictive products. In sum, the hyperbolic discounting
literature has been very influential and celebrated as a first big success of the
interaction between psychology and economics.
More recently, however, much of this enthusiasm with hyperbolic dis-
counting has come up against important criticism. On the one hand, Read
(2001) showed that total discounting over a temporal interval increases as the
interval is more finely partitioned. Such «subadditive discounting», as Read
labelled it, is incompatible with any hyperbolic discount function (Read 2001).
On the other hand, Rubinstein (2003) showed that hyperbolic discounting
could be empirically challenged in a similar way as exponential discounting had
been challenged before. In one of his experiments, for example, Rubinstein
shows how many people prefer $997 in eleven months to $1000 in twelve
months, but at the same time they prefer a sequence of four $1000 payments
to be received in 6, 8, 10 and 12 months respectively, over a sequence of four
$997 payments to be received in 5, 7, 9 and 11 months respectively. Note that
such a time preference could never be hyperbolic, since if someone declares
he prefers $997 in eleven months to $1000 in twelve, then for any such pair
of outcomes laying closer in time, a lower discount factor would apply and
would increase the preference for $997, implying a higher preference for the
$997 sequence over the $1000 sequence23.
23. Rubinstein claims his results are due to the similarity of € 997 and € 1000 (see Rubinstein
2003 for the argument). But Loewe & Read (2005) have replicated his results controlling
for the similarity explanation, and showed it is in fact the ‘magnitude effect’ that is respon-
sible for this phenomenon as we will next see.
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‘opponent’ to exponential discounting, one representing the benefits of exper-
imental economics and psychology. In fact, the question we may ask ourselves
is why it has not achieved to displace exponential discounting, as one would
reasonably expect (it explains dynamic inconsistency, it fits data statistically
better —see Fredrick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002)—, it is parsimo-
nious, and it fits intuition). I will answer this question in the next section, but
first let me describe other anomalies found in the literature over these years.
Other Anomalies
As we have shown earlier, discounted utility not only relies upon the hypothe-
sis of constant discount rates. Many other discounted utility assumptions exist
and have been tested, revealing a collection of other well known anomalies that
have established in the literature in a similar way as there is a collection of
expected utility anomalies (Loewenstein & Prelec 1992; Fredrick, Loewenstein
& O’Donoghue 2002). As we will next see, Samuelson’s proposed mathemat-
ical structure is unable to capture many common preference patterns.
The «sign effect»: in many studies gains are discounted at a higher rate than
losses. Imagine someone receives a traffic ticket and is asked how much he is
willing to pay to delay the payment by three months. Now consider the same
problem framed with gains: someone has won a prize and is asked how much
he would need to be paid to accept receiving the money three months later.
Thaler (1981) showed the underlying discount rates differ significantly for
both framings. In fact, in many studies subjects have shown a preference to
incur in a loss immediately rather than delaying it (Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil
1989; Loewenstein 1987; MacKeigan et al. 1993; Mischel, Grusec & Masters
1969; Redelmeier & Heller 1993; Yates & Watts 1975).
The «magnitude effect»: larger outcomes are discounted at a lower rate than
smaller outcomes. In virtually all studies that vary outcome size, a clear «mag-
nitude effect» has been revealed by the choices of subjects, an effect that is
now one of the most robust findings in intertemporal choice (Ainslie & Haendel
1983; Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil 1989; Chapman & Winquist 1998; Green,
Fristoe & Myerson 1994; Green, Fry & Myerson 1994; Holcomb & Nelson
1992; Kirby 1997; Kirby & Marakovic 1996; Kirby, Petry & Bickel 1999;
Loewenstein 1987; Raineri & Rachlin 1993; Shelley 1993; Thaler 1981). See,
for example, 1 month discount rates revealed in Thaler (1981)24:
Amount 1-month equivalent
$15 $20 (345%)
$250 $300 (219%)
$3000 $3100 (39%)
24. 1-month equivalents are observed median values.
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been shown to explain several phenomena. One of them is, for example, the
finding that a whole sequence of outcomes is discounted at a lower rate than
single outcomes are (Kirby & Guastello 2001, Ainslie & Monterosso 2003;
and also, Rubinstein 2003), an effect usually attributed to hyperbolic dis-
counting (Ainslie & Haslam 1992). Imagine the following four options:
oct nov 15 dec 15 jan 15 feb 15 mar 15 apr 15 may 15 jun 15
Option A €200
Option B €210
Option C €200 €200 €200 €200
Option D €210 €210 €210 €210
Many people prefer A over B but D over C, which implies a lower dis-
count rate for sequences. But Loewe & Read (2005) have shown that this effect
disappears if you control for the magnitude effect by asking also the follow-
ing question:
oct nov 15 dec 15 jan 15 feb 15 mar 15 apr 15 may 15 jun 15
Option E €800
Option F €840
Virtually all the people preferring D over C chose also F over E, which
indicates when single outcomes have the same total value than sequences there
is no apparent difference in discount rates between single outcomes and
sequences of outcomes. Thus, the magnitude effect is in fact the best expla-
nation for an apparent lower discount rate for sequences.
The «delay-speedup» asymmetry: Loewenstein (1998) found that respon-
dents who expected receiving a VCR in one year would pay an average of $54
to receive it immediately, while those who expected receiving it immediately
demanded an average of $126 to delay its receipt by a year. Other studies have
confirmed these findings (Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil 1989; Shelley 1993),
which suggest that an individual’s reference point is relevant for his intertem-
poral choices.
«Sequence» effects: discounted utility evaluates a sequence of outcomes by
adding each outcome’s discounted values, independently of whether the
sequence has any particular shape (increasing or decreasing, for example). The
literature has nevertheless found that people systematically prefer increasing
sequences of consumption over decreasing ones adding up to the same total
amount (Ariely & Carmon 2003; Fredrick & Loewenstein 2002; Loewenstein
& Prelec 1993; Loewenstein & Sicherman 1991). For example, Loewenstein &
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declining or flat one, even after being reminded that a decreasing sequence
has a higher total present value due to higher interests over the larger-sooner
outcomes. Analogously, when sequences were framed as streams of pain
(headache pain, for example), respondents showed a clear preference for decreas-
ing over increasing sequences, indicating pain was preferred sooner rather than
later (Chapman 2000). In general, when subjects choose among different
sequences of two events people tend to save the better thing for last, contra-
dicting the standard assumption of a positive interest rate.
In addition to this preference-for-improvement finding, other sequence
effects are reported in the literature. Loewenstein & Prelec (1993) found a pref-
erence for uniformly spreading of outcomes in a sequence. People tend to pre-
fer (0,1,0,1,0,1,0) rather than (0,0,1,1,1,0,0,) showing a tendency to like even-
ly distributed sequences. Also, research in retrospective evaluation of experiences
started by Kahneman et al. (1993) has shown a preference for two particular
«moments» in a sequence, the peak and the end. Several studies have found that
a weighted average of experiences at these two particular points in time suffices
to explain individuals’ retrospective overall evaluation of experiences. The rea-
son for it is that memory stores only highlights of an experience, and this is the
only information that is afterwards used when the time comes to make a ret-
rospective evaluation (see also Ariely & Carmon 2003 for a review on the evi-
dence). In sum, preferences for sequences appear to be essentially different from
preferences for single outcomes. Once people perceive they are choosing among
objects embedded in a sequence, they act according to a collection of new rea-
sons regarding the specific shape of the sequence (see Read & Powell 2000 for
a qualitative study on these reasons). Put in other words: we can conclude that
‘gestalt properties’ matter; and discounted utility does not account for them.
We have seen a collection of anomalies that casts serious doubts on dis-
counted utility as a descriptive theory of intertemporal choice. The reported
findings are quite intuitive, too; in fact, most of us could well be represen-
ted by these preference patterns, despite which they cannot be accommodated
into Samuelson’s mathematical structure. Now the obvious questions are the fol-
lowing: why is discounted utility still regarded as the standard approach? Why
not use hyperbolic discounting instead, which appears to perform empirical-
ly better, and is as parsimonious as exponential discounting? Or, why has no
other alternative model really established? These questions are particularly
intriguing: intertemporal choice is a perfect example of how a specific social
theory can become an interdisciplinary field of research, and open itself to
experimental scrutiny25; what is then obstructing its further development?
25. Contrary to other economic theories, intertemporal choice has even achieved both pre-
dictive improvement and interest in securing such improvement, the two features Rosenberg
regards as symptoms of epistemological health (Rosenberg 1992).
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as Dynamic Consistency Reconsidered
In order to answer the questions we just posed, we need to go back first to
what the concept of rationality means for economic science. As it is widely
known, choice theory is based upon the idea of preference relations describ-
ing people’s behaviour. Preference relations’ particular structure —complete-
ness and transitivity— ensures we can represent such preferences by a func-
tion assigning a value to each object of choice, which makes it possible to
interpret an individual’s choices as if he aimed at maximizing the value of this
function26. Now rational choice theory consists basically in assuming people
do in fact have such (stable27) preference relations. But why should they?
Many economists like to answer with the money-pump argument.
According to this idea, an individual with intransitive preferences would be
easy to exploit by an arbitrageur. Suppose an individual’s preferences over three
objects were as follows:
A > B and B > C; but C > A
This individual will thus be ready to exchange C plus a certain quantity
(say, one cent) to obtain B, which he values more. But then, he will also accept
exchanging B plus one cent to get A; and finally, also A plus one cent to get
C. Such a cycle would bring him back to his original situation possessing C, but
having spent 3 cents! Thus, this subject can easily be exploited by an arbi-
trageur, who could keep indefinitely pumping money out of him until com-
plete ruin.
The money-pump argument is far from being uncontroversial from a tech-
nical-economical point of view (see, among others, Cubitt & Sudgen 2001;
Machina 1989; McClennen 1990; Sudgen 1991; Anand 1993; Kelsey & Milne
1997; Yaari 1998). But its fundamental idea is that economic theory has rea-
sons to believe that most of the people behave most of the time transitively,
or otherwise they would not ‘survive’. A basic normative principle —it is bad
to be ruined— becomes a positive theory by arguing that exposure to a money-
pump would immediately be exploited by arbitrageurs.
26. This idea has produced much confusion among economists and non-economists. If we
restrict our attention to the descriptive meaning of this theory, it does not mean to assume
that people consciously optimize behaviour; it just says if choices are consistent in the sense
of complete and transitive, then they can be interpreted as the result of an optimization of
an arbitrary function. (Note, in fact, that the argument would work also if we substitute
optimization by minimization: a preference relation can be represented by a function so
that most valued options are assigned the lowest values, and we can thereafter conclude the
individual aims at minimizing utility). The key point is that preferences are consistent in a
way as to be interpreted as the result of the choice of the first option in a ranking.
27. Stability of preference relations is very important, since the opposite —changing prefer-
ences— would be completely non-informative; any possible behaviour would fit in the
preference relations’ theory (Rosenberg 1992).
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that dynamic consistency is considered a rationality principle for intertempo-
ral choice. The rationality of dynamic consistency can be founded ultimately
on the same argument we just saw. A dynamic inconsistent individual could be
brought to ruin by an arbitrageur. To illustrate this, imagine that Alex has a
lasting preference for €11 in 24 hours over €10 in 22 hours, but prefers €10
immediately to €11 in two hours. Helene offers to sell him €11 in 24 hours for
€10 in 22 hours. Alex agrees. 22 hours later, Alex gives Helene €10. But now
his preferences have changed and he would prefer keeping the €10 rather than
getting €12 in two hours. Helene thus offers to give him the €10, if he agrees
to pay her €11 plus, say, one cent in two hours. Alex agrees and in two hours
Helene is one cent better off. Helene then offers to sell Alex €11 in 24 hours…
and so on. Now a hyperbolic discounter, the argument continues, has pre-
cisely such a preference structure, and thus could easily be exploited to ruin. On
the contrary, exponential discounters are invulnerable to such money-pumps,
and are therefore expected to proliferate in society.
The problem of such quasi-evolutionary foundations of social theories is
that they are only ‘quasi’ right. In effect, imagine most of the people were
sophisticated hyperbolic discounters as follows: if they detect an arbitrageur, they
do not make any deal with him (they give up a certain opportunity to be bet-
ter off in order to morally punish arbitrageurs)28; in any other situation, they
behave normally. This means there would be no incentives at all for arbitrageurs
to operate. We could then perfectly observe a vast majority of hyperbolic dis-
counters behaving dynamically inconsistent in their every day life, without
causing their selves any fatal damage by doing so. The money-pump-based
justification of dynamic consistency as a rationality principle thus relies upon
viewing people as naive decision-makers.
Moreover; suppose now there were no sophisticated behaviours, and that
hyperbolic discounters were naively exposed to exploitation. We still need cer-
tain preconditions in order to support the money-pump defence of exponen-
tial discounting: for example, it is needed that the specific arbitrage opportu-
nities are enough to make a living out of it. How much work would be needed
by the arbitrageurs to earn how much money? Would this be more worth doing
than a regular job? Would the moral discomfort outweigh the monetary incen-
tives? If these circumstances are not met, we simply cannot infer dynamically
inconsistent individuals would not survive. Hence, the money-pump argu-
ment also relies upon the worthiness of arbitrage for arbitrageurs.
Finally, I want to point at a third objection to the money-pump argument
for dynamic consistency, due to Albrecht & Weber (1995). Many decisions
are completely binding, not subject to future reconsideration. For those kinds
of decisions there is no possible argument in favour of exponential discount-
28. The existence of punishing behaviour that goes against one’s interests is now empirically
well founded in the literature (see, for example, Thaler (1989) on the so-called ultimatum
game).
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prevents the individual to discount future values hyperbolically since such
behaviour would not produce any dynamic inconsistency to be exploited by
arbitrageurs. Thus, even if the money-pump argument should have any valid-
ity, this very same validity would depend on the decision context.
As we can see, then, dynamic consistency and money-pump arguments are
not rigorous principles to sustain exponential discounting as a descriptive the-
ory of intertemporal choice. But, are they valid normative principles? Is it true
that being dynamically consistent is necessarily ‘good’? The answer is also ‘no’.
There is no ultimate reason why someone should obey his previous decisions,
for we cannot grant a past ‘self ’ a higher moral authority than a present ‘self ’.
As Strotz put it, we may ask ourselves «at which date should sovereignty inhere
in the [decision] maker» (Strotz 1956, p179). The concept of consumer sov-
ereignty has no meaning in the context of dynamic decision-making (Strotz
1956) and, for that reason, Samuelson himself regarded discounted utility as
lacking normative legitimacy as a rational intertemporal choice model
(Samuelson 1937).
Now despite all these considerations, economic thought has put the strait-
jacket of dynamic consistency to intertemporal choice theories. First it has
used the principle stating dynamic inconsistency is bad per se to automatical-
ly assimilate dynamic consistency to rationality. Then it has shown that only
exponential discounting is completely free of inconsistencies, and thus the
only possible rational intertemporal choice theory. Finally, it has used this nor-
mative support to argue that exponential discounting ought to be also the
standard descriptive intertemporal choice model. Experimental work has uncov-
ered the flaws of such reasoning. But the strong normative case for exponen-
tial discounting has restricted much of the attention to the exponential-vs-
hyperbolic discounting debate, and blinded the many other fundamental
problems in discounted utility we have reviewed in the previous section.
The development of intertemporal choice has in consequence for many
years been interrupted by principles founded in what we could consider «folk
logic». These principles have hindered the ability of the theory to evolve between
the 50’s and the 90’s, and, to some extent, it continues obstructing its further
development. And the dynamic consistency requirement has proven particu-
larly hard to withdraw from intertemporal choice, since its normative limita-
tions hide behind a basic intuition identifying inconsistency with the bad29.
But this intuition is wrong. There is no ultimate reason why someone behav-
ing only sometimes inconsistently is producing harm to himself, for there is
no ultimate reason why the ‘planner’ makes always good plans for the ‘doer’.
There may indeed be reasons to consider someone who is continuously aban-
doning his plans is producing himself harm; but the fact that someone’s pref-
29. We could see the strong power of this moral intuition in the US presidential campaign
2004, where huge amounts of money were devoted to prove electors that one candidate
was a «flip-flap», changing continuously his mind on important issues.
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imply he will be exposed to continuous dynamic inconsistency, as if an iron
rod had totally damaged his brain. The identification of dynamic inconsistent
preference structures with the bad relies thus on an invariance assumption say-
ing that preferences remain the same across all periods and circumstances,
including the situation in which someone perceives he is catched in a money-
pump. Naturally, any mathematical representation of choice needs to make
such simplifications, or the theory would become completely impossible to
handle; but the choice of the normative principles that ought to define valid-
ity of theoretical models should not drag these simplifications.
Fortunately, today intertemporal choice seems to be starting to undo this
straitjacket and rapidly generating valuable alternative theories that are free
from its complex about dynamic inconsistency, as we have seen in a previous
section. Experimental work in intertemporal choice has been crucial in this
process, since it has made the invisible straitjacket visible. But the empirical
findings had been impossible without knowing before what to test.
Intertemporal choice hence owes its progress to the spirit of Samuelson’s «sta-
tistical experiment» (Samuelson 1937), consisting of specifying a mathemati-
cal model even without having complete confidence either on its normative
or on its positive validity. This may indicate us social scientists that analytical
thinking is probably not only convenient as guarantor of the internal consis-
tency of our theories, but –more importantly- a necessary condition for their
empirical scrutiny, a scrutiny that turns out to be crucial to reveal hidden
assumptions. A wrong, specified theory will be proven wrong sooner or later;
but a wrong, unspecified theory may remain invisibly wrong forever.
Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to describe the evolution of a very dynamic
theory: the theory of intertemporal choice. I have presented the first economic
thinking on intertemporal decision-making, and exposed how it resulted in
Samuelson’s famous discounted utility model; then I have described how and
why discounted utility became the standard approach to intertemporal choice
in economics through the alleged normative and positive validity of dynamic
consistency. Next, I have reviewed how the widening of experiments chal-
lenged discounted utility together with the dynamic consistency hypothesis,
and turned intertemporal choice into a truly interdisciplinary field of research.
Finally, I have discussed the foundations of dynamic consistency and proved that
it is neither normatively nor descriptively justified as a necessary axiom of
rational intertemporal choice. I have also showed how until only recently, the
dynamic consistency debate has had a blinding effect on the relative impor-
tance attributed to other fundamental anomalies in discounted utility. And
this blinding effect can be regarded as a further side-effect of the excessive role
given to dynamic consistency along these years. I have thus concluded that
dynamic consistency has been acting as an invisible straitjacket obstructing
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ing it that this field of research can achieve in the future a satisfactory under-
standing of human decision-making.
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